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Abstract 
CO2 cap-and-trade mechanisms and CO2 emission taxes are becoming increasingly widespread. 
To assess the impact of a CO2 price, marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) are a commonly 
used tool by policy makers, providing a direct graphical link between a CO2 price and the 
expected abatement. However, such MACCs can suffer from issues related to robustness and 
granularity. This paper focuses on the relation between a CO2 emission cost and CO2 emission 
reductions in the power sector. The authors present a new methodology that improves the 
understanding of the relation between a CO2 cost and CO2 abatement. The methodology is based 
on the insight that CO2 emissions in the power sector are driven by the composition of the 
conventional power portfolio, the residual load and the generation costs of the conventional units. 
The methodology addresses both the robustness issue and the granularity issue related to 
MACCs. The methodology is based on a bottom-up approach, starting from engineering 
knowledge of the power sector. It offers policy makers a new tool to assess CO2 abatement 
options. The methodology is applied to the Central Western European power system and 
illustrates possible interaction effects between, e.g., fuel switching and renewables deployment. 
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1. Introduction 
Policy measures aiming at reducing CO2 emissions are becoming increasingly widespread. In this respect 
the power sector plays an important role due to its notable share in total emissions - about 30% of 
European CO2 emissions originate from the power sector (Eurostat, 2014) - and its considerable abatement 
potential (Rootzén and Johnsson, 2013). 
Two main types of (direct) emission policies exist; a price instrument imposing a fixed payment per 
emitted unit (e.g., a CO2 emission tax) and a quantity instrument imposing an aggregated emission cap, 
possibly combined with a trade mechanism in emission allowances (e.g., a cap-and-trade mechanism). 
Both types of policy result in a cost of emitting CO2. A widely used tool to think about the impact of 
emission policy is the concept of marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs). A MACC plots the shadow 
price corresponding to an emission constraint of increasing severity against the quantity abated. A point 
on the MACC represents the marginal cost of abating an additional unit of emissions (Ellerman and 
Decaux, 1998). As such, a MACC links emission abatement to an emission cost (being a CO2 tax or a CO2 
price)1.  
Roughly speaking, two main methods are used to develop MACCs. The first method consists of a top-
down approach based on macroeconomic models, often in a general equilibrium framework. The second 
method uses a bottom-up approach, based on detailed optimization models or expert knowledge of a 
system, mostly in a partial equilibrium framework (Jacoby, 1998). The advantage of the top-down 
approach is that it aims to capture all effects of a CO2 cost, including feedback loops like changes in fossil 
fuel prices. However, these top-down models are limited to less detailed representations of each sector and 
each country. The engineering bottom-up approach allows a very detailed description of a certain sector, 
but this comes at the expense that not all effects and feedback loops in the system can be captured 
(Jacoby, 1998). The trade-off between bottom-up and top-down models is a reoccurring discussion in 
                                                           
1 Throughout this paper the term CO2 cost is used, expressed in EUR/tCO2. A CO2 cost might reflect a CO2 price within a cap-
and-trade mechanism (e.g., the European Emission Trading System) or a CO2 tax.  
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energy systems modeling and often aspects from both approaches are combined (Labandeira et al., 2009). 
Models often referred to in the literature on MACCs are, among others, the EPPA model of MIT (Paltsev 
et al., 2005), the POLES model developed by IEPE (European Commission, 2010; Criqui et al., 1999) and 
the DART model developed at the Kiel Institute for World Economics (Klepper et al., 2003). 
Although MACCs are a commonly used tool to analyze the impact of a CO2 cost on CO2 abatement – or 
vice versa, some general issues can be raised with regard to these curves. For the construction of MACCs, 
models are used often based on a centralized optimization, with perfect information. In reality, specific 
technical constraints, and elements of imperfect information and risk perception result in abatement 
measures getting implemented over a range of CO2 prices, rather than on distinct CO2 prices. MACCs are 
also rather static snap-shots (Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte, 2014). As CO2 prices rise, measures will get 
implemented and learning effects will be triggered. In this regard, as different abatement measures relate 
to different time horizons (e.g., pure operational measures versus long term investments) it might not be 
straightforward putting them on a single axis. When derived from modeling (either top-down or bottom-
up), some further reflections are to be made regarding MACCs. Kesicki and Ekins (2012) give an 
overview of the shortcomings of MACCs, with robustness being one of the most critical ones. Each model 
used to derive MACCs is based on external parameters (Kesicki, 2013). A MACC is robust if it is 
insensitive to changes in these parameters. In the literature, consensus seems to be that MACCs are not 
very robust (Klepper and Peterson, 2006; Fischer and Morgenstern, 2006; Delarue et al., 2010; Morris et 
al., 2012). Another issue with regard to MACCs is the level of granularity. A MACC with high granularity 
might give a detailed cost-emission relation of a single abatement technology, without taking account of 
overlapping and mutually influencing abatement technologies. On the other hand, a MACC with low 
granularity might give an aggregated cost-emission relation but without revealing the driving technology 
of the abatement at a certain CO2 emission cost.  
This paper addresses both the robustness issue and the granularity issue related to marginal abatement cost 
curves, applied to the power sector. A new methodology is developed, based on knowledge of the drivers 
of CO2 emissions in the power sector. A key concept of the presented methodology is the so-called 
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absolute emission plane, which represents the relation between CO2 emissions in the power sector and its 
drivers. MACCs can be derived from the absolute emission plane by combining it with the relation 
between a CO2 emissions cost and the respective emission drivers. The methodology provides insight in 
the way that a MACC is composed combining several abatement technologies (i.e., the granularity issue). 
The methodology further illustrates how changes in external parameters influence the MACC (i.e., the 
robustness issue). The main objective of the presented methodology is to deepen the understanding of the 
relation between a CO2 emission cost and CO2 emission abatement in the power sector. The methodology 
can be used by policy makers to quantify the impact of a CO2 emission cost and assess the robustness of 
this impact.   
The presented methodology is based on a bottom-up approach. To this end, a partial equilibrium model of 
the power sector is used, describing the power sector with a high level of detail. The methodology is 
illustrated with a case study of the Central Western European (CWE) power sector (Germany, France, 
Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg). 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes a framework to think about CO2 emissions and CO2 
abatement in the power sector and the new methodology to derive MACCs. Section 3 presents the results 
of this methodology for a case study of the Central Western European power sector, addressing the policy 
implications. Section 4 discusses these results and section 5 concludes. 
2. Methods 
The applied methodology falls apart in two steps. First, a framework is presented to structure the drivers 
of CO2 emissions in the power sector. Second, this framework can be used as a basis to study MACCs, 
considering the robustness issue and granularity issue related to MACCs. This section also discusses the 
investigated case study and the model. 
2.1.  CO2 emissions in the power sector: a framework 
Different parameters that influence the CO2 emissions from the power sector can be identified and 
classified in 3 main categories of CO2 emission drivers in the power sector: 
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(1) the composition of the conventional power plant portfolio; 
(2) the residual load to be met by the conventional power plant portfolio;   
(3) the marginal generation costs of the conventional power plant portfolio. 
Each of these drivers is discussed more in detail in this section.  
2.1.1.  The conventional generation portfolio 
The conventional generation portfolio consists of power plants that can be actively controlled by 
generation companies. The most common conventional units are nuclear power plants and fossil fuel fired 
power plants (coal, gas, lignite, and fuel oil). Renewables generation (wind and sun) can only be actively 
controlled to a limited extent and are therefore not considered as part of the conventional portfolio (but 
accounted for in the residual load). 
The composition of the conventional generation portfolio is a first important driver of the CO2 emissions 
in the power sector. Depending on the fuel mix and the average power plant age (impacting, among 
others, the operating efficiency), portfolios can have very different CO2 intensities. To illustrate this, 
Figure 1 shows the CO2 intensity of electricity generation for some European Member States. The French 
generation portfolio consists mainly of nuclear power plants and hydro power plants, resulting in a very 
low CO2 intensity. Electricity generation in Poland, on the other hand, is to a large extent based on coal 
and lignite fired plants, resulting in a high CO2 intensity. The other shown member states have CO2 
intensities between these two relative extreme values. 
CO2 abatement can be achieved by changing the installed conventional generation capacity or its technical 
parameters. Possible abatement actions are (non-exhaustive list): 
• investments in nuclear power plants (CO2 free electricity generation); 
• investments in new gas fired plants (relatively low CO2 emissions); 
• closing down lignite or coal fired plants (relatively high CO2 emissions); 
• retrofitting existing fossil fuel fired plants (resulting in a higher efficiencies); 
• implementing carbon capture and storage. 
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A CO2 cost might trigger CO2 abatement by changing the conventional power plant portfolio through one 
of the listed abatement options. Conventional power plant portfolios are relatively inert, implying that a 
CO2 cost causes CO2 abatement by changing the composition of the conventional portfolio only in the 
long term. For example, typical lead times for new conventional plants range from 2 years for combined 
cycle units up to 7 years for nuclear units (IEA, 2010).  
2.1.2. The residual load 
The residual load that has to be met by the conventional power plant portfolio is the original electricity 
demand minus generation from renewables and cogeneration units. Logically, the higher the residual load, 
the higher the CO2 emissions from the power system.  
CO2 abatement can be achieved by reducing the residual load. Possible abatement actions are (non-
exhaustive list): 
• investments in renewable generation capacity (wind and sun); 
• increasing the energy efficiency of electrical appliances; 
• demand reduction. 
A CO2 cost might trigger CO2 abatement by decreasing the residual load through one of the listed 
abatement options. Decreasing the residual load plays a role in the medium term. For example, lead times 
of new wind and solar capacity are about 1 year (IEA, 2010). In the short term (days to weeks), electricity 
demand is rather inelastic. In the medium term, however, the electricity demand can be expected to be 
partially elastic, representing, among others, investments in more efficient appliances. 
2.1.3.  The marginal generation costs  
The marginal generation costs of the available conventional plants determine the merit order. The merit 
order is a ranking of all available power plants in ascending order of marginal generation cost. The 
intersection of the merit order with the residual electricity load divides the power plant portfolio in 
operating power units, i.e., the ones at the left of the intersection, and non-operating power plants, i.e., the 
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ones at the right of the intersection2 (see Figure 2). Power plants with low marginal generation costs are 
thus more likely to be online than power plants with higher marginal generation costs. At 2014 fuel and 
CO2 prices in Europe, the ranking in the merit order is roughly speaking the following: nuclear units, 
lignite fired units, coal fired units, gas fired units and fuel oil fired units. At the time of writing, coal fired 
plants are hence more likely to produce in Europe than gas fired power plants.  
CO2 abatement can be achieved by changing the marginal generation costs of conventional power plants, 
resulting in so-called fuel switching. Fuel switching occurs when the marginal generation cost of high-
emitting plants (e.g., coal fired plants) becomes higher than the marginal generation cost of low-emitting 
plants (e.g., gas fired plants), leading to a switch of these plants in the merit order. The result is that more 
generation is coming from low-emitting plants and overall CO2 emissions decrease.  
A CO2 cost might trigger fuel switching by increasing the marginal generation costs of emitting units. Fuel 
switching is a pure operational abatement technology, responding rapidly to a CO2 cost (power plant 
operators schedule their plants on an hourly to daily basis).  
2.1.4.  Summary 
This section discusses the three main drivers of CO2 emissions in the power sector. All possible abatement 
options can be assigned to one of these drivers. Each driver is linked to a certain time frame. Table I 
summarizes this section. An abatement option can be triggered by a CO2 cost, but also by other energy and 
climate policies (e.g., renewables support schemes can trigger investments in renewables) or by 
macroeconomic evolutions (e.g., changing fuel prices might trigger fuel switching) (Van den Bergh et al., 
2013). The focus in this paper is on a CO2 cost triggering CO2 abatement.  
2.2.  Analysis plan to study MACCs 
Based on the insights in the CO2 emissions drivers, a detailed marginal abatement cost curve of the power 
sector can be composed in three steps: 
                                                           
2 This is only true by approximation. Dynamic power plant constraints might cause power plants with higher marginal generation 
costs to be online while plants with lower marginal costs are offline.  
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1) Quantify the relation between a CO2 cost and each of the 3 drivers of CO2 emissions in the power 
sector (conventional portfolio, residual load and marginal generation costs). This relation can be based 
on a modeling exercise or expert knowledge.   
2) Quantify the relation between the aggregated CO2 emissions in the power sector and its 3 drivers. The 
aggregated CO2 emissions follow from the partial equilibrium model of the power sector with varying 
conventional portfolio, varying residual load and varying marginal generation costs as input. The 
result of this step is a 4-dimensional surface (three CO2 drivers plus the aggregated CO2 emissions), 
referred to as the absolute emission plane. Each point on this 4-dimensional surface represents an 
operational state of the power sector. The absolute emission plane is needed to capture the interaction 
between different CO2 abatement options.  
3) Merge the information of the two previous steps to find the relation between a CO2 cost and CO2 
emissions in the power sector. This relation leads to the marginal abatement cost curve of the power 
sector.  
The different effects of a CO2 cost on each CO2 driver may not just be summed up, as the relation between 
a CO2 emission driver and the aggregated CO2 emissions depends on the other CO2 emission drivers as 
well. For instance, a change in marginal generation costs – caused by a CO2 cost – has a different effect on 
the CO2 emissions, depending on the change in residual load – caused by the same CO2 cost. This 
indicates interaction between the different CO2 emission drivers, which is captured by the partial 
equilibrium model and represented by the absolute emission plane.  
If a parameter which is external to the analysis changes (e.g., fossil fuel prices or capital costs of 
renewables), the first and the third step of the analysis plan have to be repeated. This illustrates the 
robustness issue. Changes in external parameters affect the MACC.   
In the third step of the analysis plan, several abatement technologies are combined into one single CO2 
cost-emission relation. The bottom-up nature of this methodology allows decomposing the total CO2 
abatement in its driving abatement technologies. This relates to the granularity issue. 
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The methodology, which is described in rather abstract terms up until now, will be illustrated in section 3 
for a real-life case study. The MACC of the Central Western European power sector will be discussed, 
considering two abatement technologies triggered by a CO2 cost: fuel switching and investments in wind 
energy. Fuel switching is a significant abatement option in the power sector. Wind energy can be an 
important source of CO2 free electricity generation, with a levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) which is 
several times lower than the LCOE of photovoltaic energy (IEA, 2010). The case study considers a 
medium term time frame. Within this time frame, both fuel switching and investments in wind energy 
might take place. The composition of the conventional power plant portfolio, which can change only in 
the long term, is assumed to be fixed. 
The presented methodology implicitly assumes that the three CO2 emission drivers are only linked through 
a CO2 cost. The interdependencies between marginal generation costs (fossil fuel prices), conventional 
power plant portfolios (fossil fuel fired capacities) and residual load (electricity demand and renewable 
investments), caused by factors other than a CO2 cost, are not captured by the methodology. This 
originates from the bottom-up nature of the presented methodology.   
2.3.  System description 
The methodology is applied to the Central Western European (CWE) power sector, based on 2012 data. 
The CWE region covers France, Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg (see Figure 3). 
Each country is represented by one node and the market coupling is established according to the Net 
Transfer Capacity (NTC) method. The conventional generation portfolio in this region consists of 342 
units with a total generation capacity of 175 GW. The composition of the conventional portfolio is 
considered to be fixed in the remainder of the study (only the impact on CO2 emissions of the residual 
load and marginal generation costs are investigated). Table II gives an overview of the installed capacity 
together with the parameters assigned to the respective units. Different rated efficiencies are allocated to 
power plants depending on the year of commissioning. The average 2012 fuel prices were used (EEX, 
2013).  
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A whole year is considered in order to take the seasonality of the electricity demand and renewables 
generation into account. The 2012 annual demand in the CWE region was 1220 TWh (demand corrected 
for neglected import and export with countries not included in the model). 16% of this demand was 
fulfilled by renewable generation (wind, photovoltaic, bio, and hydro) and 13% by electricity from 
cogeneration units. The remaining residual load, to be fulfilled by the conventional portfolio, was 866 
TWh. Historical hourly demand time series and renewable generation time series are used. 
Demand data, renewables data, NTC values and power plant portfolio data originates from Entso-e (2014), 
Elia (2014), Tennet (2014) and the Umweltbundesamt (2014).   
2.4.  Model description 
A detailed unit commitment model of the power sector is developed to simulate the CWE power system. 
A unit commitment model is a partial equilibrium model that determines the optimal scheduling of a given 
set of power plants to meet the electricity demand, taking account of operational constraints. The 
presented unit commitment model is purely operational (i.e., no investments in generation or transmission 
capacity are considered), deterministic (i.e., neglecting uncertainties in the power system) and assumes an 
inelastic electricity demand. 
The unit commitment problem is formulated as a mixed-integer linear program (MILP) in GAMS 24.2 
and solved by CPLEX 12.6 with a relative optimality gap of 1%. Hereunder, the basic equations of the 
unit commitment model are listed, based on Carrión and Arroyo (2006) and Arroyo and Conejo (2000). A 
more extended version of the model description, including tighter and compacter formulations of the 
constraints, can be found in Van den Bergh et al. (2014). Table III gives the nomenclature used in the 
model description. 
The objective function of the unit commitment model is minimization of the total operational system cost, 
consisting of generation costs and start-up costs. 
min		 ∑ ∑ 	z,		CO + p,	MC) + SUC	v, 			    (1) 
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The objective function is subject to the market clearing condition (equation 2), renewables curtailment 
limits (equation 3), power plant generation limits (equation 4), minimum down and up times (equations 5-
6), the logic binary relation (equation 7) and trade capacity limits (equations 8-9). 
∑ AP,	z,		P
 + p,+ 	T, + T,	
 − u,	
 = D, + i,						∀	n, t        (2) 
0	 ≤ u,	
 	≤ T,	
																																																									∀	n, t    (3) 
0	 ≤ p, 	≤ P
 − P
	z,																																			∀	i, t    (4) 
1 − z, 	≥ 	∑ w,


																																					∀	i, t    (5) 
z, 	≥ 	∑ v,


																																															∀	i, t    (6) 
z, − z, + v, −w, = 0																																									∀	i, t    (7) 
i, = 	∑ A,	f,																																																															∀	n, t       (8) 
−F
 	≤ f, 	≤ F
																																																				∀	n, t    (9) 
The model solves a whole year with an hourly time resolution in weekly blocks. Different weekly 
optimizations overlap with one day and are coupled by means of sequential boundary conditions, in order 
to ensure a feasible and optimal coupling between the different optimizations. The model is calibrated so 
that the simulated generation in a simulation with historical input data matches the historical observed 
generation in the 2012 CWE power system. It takes about 3 hours to solve the unit commitment model for 
one year for the CWE region on an Intel® Core™ i7-2620M CPU @ 2.7 GHz with 8 GB RAM.   
3. Results  
The analysis plan discussed in section 2.2 is illustrated in this section based on a case study of the CWE 
power sector. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 show the relation between a CO2 cost and two CO2 drivers (the 
marginal generation costs and the residual load). Only two different abatement options are investigated in 
detail in this study (i.e., fuel switching and wind energy), but the methodology can be easily extended to 
other abatement options. Section 3.3 relates the CO2 emission drivers with the aggregated CO2 emissions 
from the power sector and section 3.4 expresses the relationship between a CO2 cost and the CO2 
emissions. 
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3.1.  CO2 cost versus marginal generation costs: fuel switching 
The relation between a CO2 cost and a marginal generation cost is different for each power plant, 
depending on the generation type and its efficiency. The marginal generation cost MC of a power plant is 
the derivative of the total generation cost function TC(P) with respect to the power output P. 
TCP = 
∙

∙ P       (10) 
MC =

∙

        (11) 
with FC the fuel cost in [EUR/MWhfuel], EF the emission factor in [tCO2/MWhfuel], CC the CO2 cost in 
[EUR/tCO2] and η the rated efficiency. The operating efficiency of the power plant is function of the 
power output of the unit (the operating efficiency decreases in part load operation). However, for the sake 
of simplicity, the dependence of the efficiency on the power output is neglected in this section3. Note that 
the marginal generation cost (see equation 11) is used in the objective function of the partial equilibrium 
model of the power sector (see equation 1). 
Equation 11 gives the relation between a CO2 cost and the marginal generation cost of one power plant. 
However, a metric is required containing information about all generation costs in the power portfolio. 
The proposed metric is the difference between the average marginal generation cost of a coal fired power 
plant and the average marginal generation cost of a gas fired power plant. The rationale is that coal fired 
and gas fired units are the main source of fuel switching as they are operating close to the margin (i.e., 
close to the intersection of the merit order with the demand curve). The metric contains average marginal 
generation costs, averaged in time and averaged over different units (with different efficiencies).  
Figure 4 shows the relation between a CO2 cost and the difference in average marginal generation costs 
between coal fired and gas fired plants. Figure 4 is based on 2012 average fuel price data (12 EUR/MWh 
                                                           
3 The dependence of the efficiency on the power output is taken into account in the unit commitment model. The non-linear 
production cost curve is approximated by a linear approximation (see equation 1). 
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for coal and 25 EUR/MWh for gas4, EEX, 2013) and average power plant characteristics. To investigate 
the impact of changes in external parameters, the relation between a CO2 cost and marginal generation 
costs is also considered for a case with a 10% higher coal price and the 2012 gas price, and for a case with 
a 10% higher gas price and the 2012 coal price. Figure 4 indicates that coal fired power plants become 
more expensive than gas fired power plants, in terms of marginal generation costs and at 2012 fuel prices, 
as of a CO2 cost of 40 EUR/tCO2.    
3.2.  CO2 cost versus residual demand: wind energy investments 
A CO2 cost might promote investments in wind generation capacity, resulting in a lower residual demand 
to be fulfilled by the conventional power plant portfolio. In this study, a dedicated model is used and set 
up to determine the relation between a CO2 cost and wind energy investments (i.e., a different model than 
the unit commitment model discussed in section 2.4). The model gives the amount of installed wind 
capacity, assuming the conventional portfolio to be fixed and solely based on 2012 power system data 
(fuel prices, demand data, etc.). The investments in wind energy are solely triggered by a CO2 emission 
cost, as no subsidies for wind energy are considered in the investment model. 
The model considers one period with the annually average residual demand and a merit order of the 
conventional generation portfolio (based on annually average fuel prices). The model estimates the 
wholesale electricity price as the marginal generation cost of the last generating unit in the merit order 
needed to meet the average residual demand. If the electricity price is higher than the levelized cost of 
electricity (LCOE) of wind, an extra MW of wind energy is installed resulting in a decrease in the average 
residual demand with 0.2 MW for onshore wind (20% capacity factor) and 0.3 MW for offshore wind 
(30% capacity factor). Then the new electricity price is calculated as the marginal generation cost of the 
last generation unit in the merit order needed to meet the reduced average residual demand. This 
electricity price will be lower than the previous calculated price. This iterative process continues until the 
estimated electricity price equals the LCOE of wind or the wind capacity potential is reached (Kagiannas 
                                                           
4 A coal price of 12 EUR/MWh corresponds to a price of 120 $/ton and a gas price of 25 EUR/MWh corresponds to a price of 10 
$/MMBtu (2012 dollar-euro exchange rate). 
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et al., 2004). The simulations are repeated for different CO2 emission costs. The model gives a rough 
estimation of the investments in wind triggered by a CO2 cost. The amount of installed wind is translated 
into a decrease in residual demand by subtracting the wind generation (estimated based on a 20% capacity 
factor for onshore wind and 30% capacity factor for offshore wind) from the original residual demand. 
Table IV shows the data used in this investment model.  
Figure 5 shows the residual demand including the additional wind generation as a function of the CO2 
cost. Again, the relation between a CO2 cost and the residual demand is considered for a case with a 10% 
higher coal price and the 2012 gas price, and for a case with a 10% higher gas price and the 2012 coal 
price. This change in fuel prices impacts the decision of the wind investors as it changes the electricity 
price, but only to a limited extent. At higher fuel prices, wind investments start taking place at slightly 
lower CO2 emission costs. The technical potential limit is not reached within the considered CO2 cost 
range.   
3.3.  Absolute emission plane 
The absolute emission plane of the power sector is, in its complete form, a 4-dimensional surface, 
containing the relation between the three CO2 emission drivers and the CO2 emissions in the power sector. 
Each point on the absolute emission plane represents a possible operational state of the power sector, 
given a certain power plant portfolio composition, certain marginal generation costs and a residual load. 
Each point on the absolute emission plane follows from a detailed simulation for a whole year (8760 
hours) with the unit commitment model as described in section 2.3. 
In this paper, the composition of the conventional portfolio is assumed fixed. As such, the absolute 
emission plane reduces to a 3-dimensional surface. Figure 6 shows the absolute emission plane of the 
2012 CWE power sector. The figure indicates that absolute CO2 emissions decrease with decreasing 
residual load and with increasing difference in marginal generation costs between coal fired and gas fired 
plants.    
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Note that the absolute emission plane of Figure 6 is based on specific 2012 data (e.g., 2012 time series for 
demand and renewables generation). Other time series would result in a slightly different absolute 
emission plane, however, the main trends and order of magnitudes would remain.  
3.4.  Deriving a marginal abatement cost curve 
A marginal abatement cost curve of the power sector can be derived, based on the relation between a CO2 
cost and the CO2 emission drivers on one hand (see section 3.1 and 3.2), and the relation between the CO2 
emission drivers and aggregated CO2 emissions on the other hand (see section 3.3). The following steps 
need to be taken: 
1. Indicate the appropriate reference point on the absolute emission plane (see point R at Figure 7a). 
The reference point gives the CO2 emissions in the power sector in case of a zero CO2 emission 
cost, and is indicated by the residual load and marginal cost difference that would occur in 
absence of a CO2 emission cost. The reference point R at Figure 7a corresponds to the residual 
load and marginal cost difference in the CWE 2012 power system at zero CO2 cost.  
2. Project the relation between a CO2 cost and each of the relevant CO2 emission drivers on the 
absolute emission plane (see dashed lines at Figure 7a). Each dashed line corresponds to a CO2 
emission driver for a CO2 cost ranging from 0 to 100 EUR/tCO2, assuming the other CO2 emission 
drivers fixed. The curve representing the relation between a CO2 cost and marginal generation 
costs starts in the reference point and is parallel to the marginal cost axis (i.e., perpendicular to the 
residual load axis). This curve is the projection of Figure 4 on the absolute emission plane. The 
curve representing the relation between a CO2 cost and residual load starts also in the reference 
point but is parallel to the residual load axis (i.e., perpendicular to the marginal cost axis). This 
curve is the projection of Figure 5 on the absolute emission plane. 
3. Compose the different CO2 cost-CO2 driver relations into one relation between a CO2 cost and 
CO2 emissions. This latter relation is represented by a trajectory on the emission plane (see solid 
line at Figure 7a). The solid line is a collection of points on the absolute emission plane 
corresponding to the CO2 emission drivers for a CO2 cost ranging from 0 to 100 EUR/tCO2. For 
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CO2 prices up to 35 EUR/tCO2, no investments in wind energy occur and the residual load 
remains unchanged. As a result, the first part of the solid line follows the dashed line 
corresponding to the relation CO2 cost vs. marginal generation costs. At higher CO2 prices, both 
dashed lines are influencing the trajectory of the solid line. 
4. In a final step, the CO2 cost-emission relation can be expressed relative to the CO2 emissions in 
the reference point, which leads to the marginal abatement cost curve (see Figure 7b).  
4. Discussion 
The methodology presented in this paper gives insight in the impact of changing external parameters. 
Consider again a case with a 10% higher coal price and the 2012 gas price, and a case with a 10% higher 
gas price and the 2012 coal price. These changes in fossil fuel prices impact the relation between a CO2 
cost and each of the CO2 emission drivers (see Figures 4 and 5). As a result, the MACC of the power 
sector will change as well. Figure 8 shows the marginal abatement cost curve and the corresponding 
trajectories on the absolute emission plane for different fossil fuel prices. This example relates to the 
robustness issue of MACCs and shows how the proposed methodology can bring insight in the 
mechanisms behind a changing external parameter – although the robustness issue is not very strong in 
this particular example. Note that a change in an external parameter changes both the reference point on 
the absolute emission plane, as well as the trajectory of the CO2 cost-emission relation. Both aspects 
impact the shape of the marginal abatement cost curve.  
The robustness of the CO2 abatement caused by a CO2 cost should be considered when designing CO2 
emission policies. As has been demonstrated, a CO2 price affects emissions in the power sector via 
different ways. Careful assessment is required to capture the non-linear effects occurring in the power 
sector. On top, other policies might target the drivers of emissions as well in parallel, and as such create 
interaction. An example is a policy that affect the residual load such as the support for renewables, or a 
policy targeting the power system composition, such as decisions on a nuclear phase out, or specific 
requirements on fossil-fired generation such as the European large combustion plant (LCP) directive 
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(European Commission, 2001). Clearly, it is crucial to take into account these effects when designing 
policies. Finally, the shape of a derived MACC might impact the choice for either a price or a quantity 
based instrument.  
The methodology also allows breaking up the MACC in its driving abatement technologies. Figures 4 and 
5 indicate that up to a CO2 emission cost of 35 EUR/tCO2, all CO2 abatement is caused by fuel switching. 
At higher CO2 emission costs, both fuel switching and wind energy investments cause CO2 emission 
abatement. The relative contribution of the different abatement technologies can be approximated based 
on the absolute emission plane. However, the relative contribution of the different abatement technologies 
can only be approximated as different abatement technologies interact with each other, meaning that the 
presence of one abatement technology can change the impact of the other abatement technology. 
Therefore, it is not possible to fully allocate abatement to one specific abatement technology. Figure 9 
shows the contribution of fuel switching and wind energy investments in the marginal abatement cost 
curve of the power sector based on 2012 prices in case of no interaction between both abatement 
technologies (based on the imaginary case where only one abatement technology is present), and the total 
abatement if both abatement technologies are in place. The abatement caused by fuel switching as the only 
abatement technology follows from projecting Figure 4 on the absolute emission plane (see dotted line 
parallel to the marginal generation cost axis on figure 7a). Analogously, the abatement caused by wind 
energy investments as the only abatement option follows from projecting Figure 5 on the absolute 
emission plane (see dotted line parallel to residual load axis on figure 7a). It turns out that at higher CO2 
costs, negative interaction occurs, meaning that the total abatement caused by fuel switching and wind 
together is lower than the sum of the abatement if the abatement technologies are separately in place. Put 
differently, the presence of fuel switching reduces the impact of wind energy investment on CO2 emission, 
and vice versa. This is however not a general conclusion, but determined by the values for the CO2 
emission drivers as used in this study (generation costs, residual load, power plant portfolio). Another 
setting of the CO2 emissions drivers might lead to positive interaction (Weigt et al., 2013). With positive 
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policy interaction, the impact of one policy instrument is enlarged by the presence of another policy 
instrument. 
Several abatement options cause CO2 abatement in a different but partially overlapping range of CO2 
costs, and interact with each other. Although it is difficult to precisely quantify ex-ante the CO2 cost range 
in which a particular CO2 abatement option will be active and what the interaction will be with other 
abatement options, policy makers should be aware of interaction effects between different CO2 abatement 
options. 
5. Conclusions and policy implications   
This paper presents a methodology that deepens the insight in the relation between a CO2 cost and CO2 
emission reductions in the power sector. The methodology is based on the insight that CO2 emissions in 
the power sector are driven by the composition of the conventional power portfolio, the residual load (i.e., 
electricity demand minus renewables generation) and the generation costs of the conventional units. 
According to the presented methodology, a marginal abatement cost curve (MACC) of the power sector 
can be composed in three steps. First, the relation between a CO2 cost and each of the CO2 emission 
drivers has to be determined. Second, the relation between the CO2 emission drivers and the CO2 
emissions in the power sector has to be determined. Third, the previous steps can be combined to 
determine the relationship between a CO2 cost and CO2 emissions in the power sector. 
The main goal of the methodology is to give additional insight in the CO2 cost-emission relationship, 
rather than deriving marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs). MACCs are facing the issue of robustness 
(i.e., sensitive to changes in external parameters) and granularity (i.e., not revealing the driving abatement 
technology at a certain CO2 price). The presented methodology addresses both issues by showing the 
effect of changing external parameters and identifying the driving abatement technologies behind the 
aggregated MACC. The methodology also quantifies the interaction between different CO2 abatement 
options. All this makes the methodology appropriate for policy makers, who can use the methodology to 
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gain understanding of the impact of a CO2 cost on the power sector and evaluate the robustness of this 
impact.    
The usefulness of the methodology has been demonstrated by means of a case study of the 2012 Central 
Western European (CWE) power sector. Fuel switching and investments in wind energy are considered as 
possible abatement technologies in the power sector.  
Based on the methodology and the case study discussed in this paper, three important policy implications 
can be formulated. First, policy makers should design their CO2 emission policy in accordance with the 
robustness of the CO2 abatement caused by an emission cost. The developed methodology provides 
insight (both qualitative and quantitative) in the CO2 emission drivers in the power sector, and in how 
these can be influenced by a CO2 price. Clearly, these drivers are also influenced by external factors or 
other policies. As such, a MACC (abatement potential at certain cost) is dependent on boundary 
conditions and should always be positioned as such. This can also impact the choice or preference 
between either a price or a quantity based instrument directly targeting CO2. 
Second, CO2 abatement options are gradually deployed in a range of CO2 costs. The case study shows that 
in the CWE power sector, investments in wind energy are only triggered as of a CO2 cost of about 35 
EUR/tCO2. At lower CO2 costs, only fuel switching occurs. However, fuel switching is still occurring at 
CO2 costs above 35 EUR/tCO2.  
Third, policy makers should pay attention to interaction effects. The 2012 CWE example indicates 
negative interaction between fuel switching and wind energy investments. Negative interaction occurs 
when the impact of two CO2 abatement options - which are simultaneously in place, triggered by a CO2 
price - is smaller than the sum of the abatement when they are in place as the only abatement option. 
Interaction between different CO2 abatement options in the power sector is caused by the non-linear nature 
of the generation scheduling problem. This non-linear nature is captured by the so-called absolute 
emission plane, introduced in this paper. The negative interaction between fuel switching and wind 
energy, as indicated in this paper, is not a general conclusion as it depends on the considered case study 
and boundary conditions (e.g., fuel prices). It however shows the complexity of solid policy design. 
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Interactions between different energy and climate policies might occur, impacting the overall policy effect 
on CO2 emissions. 
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Figure 1. The CO2 intensity of electricity generation varies strongly from country to country, depending to a large extent on the 
installed generation portfolio - 2009 data (Eurelectric, 2011). 
 
Figure 2. Merit order of the CWE region (based on 2012 data) and the inelastic average residual load. NUC: nuclear units, SPP-L: lignite fired 
steam power plants, SPP-C: coal fired steam power plants, SPP-G: gas fired steam power plants, CCGT: combined cycle gas turbines, OCGT: 
open cycle gas turbines, IC: internal combustion engines. 
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Figure 3. Map of Europe with the CWE region denoted in gray. 
 
Figure 4. Relation between a CO2 cost and the difference in average marginal generation cost between coal and gas fired power 
plants, used as a metric for the marginal generation costs of the conventional power plant portfolio. 
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Figure 5. Relation between a CO2 cost and the residual load, caused by investments in new wind capacity. 
 
Figure 6. The absolute emission plane of the CWE power sector, based on 2012 data. 
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a) Absolute emission plane.       b) Marginal abatement cost curve. 
Figure 7. The marginal abatement cost curve can be derived by projecting the CO2 cost-driver relations on the absolute emission 
plane. Figures 4 and 5 link the left panel with the right panel. 
 
a) Absolute emission plane.       b) Marginal abatement cost curve. 
Figure 8. The marginal abatement cost curve depends on the fossil fuel prices imposed to the power system. 
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Figure 9. Relative contribution of fuel switching and wind energy investments to CO2 abatement. 
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Table I. Overview of the 3 main CO2 emission drivers in the power sector. 
 
Table II. Overview of installed capacity in the 2012 Central Western European region. Different rated efficiencies are allocated 
depending on the year of commissioning. The highest rated efficiency is allocated to units commissioned or retrofitted after 2000, 
the middlemost to units commissioned between 1980 and 2000, and the lowest to units commissioned before 1980. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CO2 emission driver Possible abatement options Time frame 
conventional portfolio • investments in nuclear power plants 
• investments in gas fired plants 
• closing down lignite or coal fired plants  
• retrofitting fossil fuel fired plants 
• carbon capture and storage 
long term 
(several years) 
residual load • investments in renewable generation capacity 
• increasing the efficiency of appliances 
• demand reduction due to higher electricity 
prices 
medium term 
(months-years) 
marginal generation costs • fuel switching short term 
(days-months) 
 Capacity  Efficiency Min. output Up/down time 
 [GW] [%] [%Pmax] [h] 
NUC 82 33 50 168 
SPP-C 26 35/40/46 43 6 
SPP-L 22 35/40/46 43 24 
SPP-G 4 35/40/46 32 5 
CCGT 31 40/48/58 35 3 
OCGT 5 35/42 30 1 
IC 5 35/40/48 35 3 
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Table III. Nomenclature used in the model description. 
 
 
Table IV. Overview of the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) and the technical potential of wind energy in the CWE region 
(IEA, 2010; EEA, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
Sets Parameters 
 I (i) Set of power plants  Al,n Grid incidence matrix {-1,0,1} 
 L (l) Set of transmission lines  APn,i
 Matrix linking plant i to node n {0,1} 
 N (n) Set of nodes  COi Generation cost at min. output [EUR/h] 
 T (t) Set of time steps  Dn,t Electricity demand in [MW] 
Variables  Fl
max Capacity limit in [MW]  
 in,t Grid injections in [MW]  MCi Marginal generation cost in [EUR/MWh] 
 fl,t, Line flow in [MW]  MDTi Minimum down time in [h] 
 pi,t Output above min output in [MW]  MUTi Minimum up time in [h] 
 un,t
RES Renewables curtailment in [MW]  Pi
max Maximum power output in [MW] 
 vi,t Start-up status {0,1}  Pi
min Minimum power output in [MW] 
 wi,t Shut-down status {0,1}  SUCi Start-up cost in [EUR/start] 
 zi,t On/off-status {0,1}  Tn,t
CHP Generation from cogeneration in [MW] 
    Tn,t
RES Generation from renewables in [MW] 
 LCOE [EUR/MWh] Technical potential [GW] 
 Wind onshore Wind offshore Wind onshore Wind offshore 
Belgium 68 128 250 11 
The Netherlands 58 88 350 110 
Germany 71 94 2000 80 
France 61 98 2700 90 
